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In this paper, we study how social planners should exploit social comparisons to pursue their objectives.
We consider two modes of social comparison, referred to as behind-averse and ahead-seeking behaviors,
depending on whether individuals experience a utility loss from under-performing or a utility gain from over-
performing relative to their peers. Modeling social comparison as a game between players, we nd that ahead-
seeking behavior leads to output polarization whereas behind-averse behavior leads to output clustering.
A social planner can mitigate these eects in two ways, (i) by providing the full reference distribution of
outputs instead of an aggregate reference point based on the average output, and (ii) by assigning players
into uniform rather than diverse reference groups. Social planners may thus need to tailor the reference
structure to the predominant mode of social comparison and their objective. A performance-focused social
planner may set the reference structure so as to maximize the output of either the top or the bottom
player depending on whether she puts greater marginal weight to larger or smaller outputs. When the social
planner also cares about utility, she faces a dilemma because performance-optimization may not be aligned
with utility-maximization. Inevitably, the social planner will have to confront equity issues because better
performance may not reect greater eort or greater ability.
Key words : social comparisons, reference points, behavioral operations, non-cooperative game theory
History :
1. Introduction
In many social contexts, people exhibit a natural tendency to compare themselves against their
peers. Furthermore, the amount of eort individuals put into an activity may be driven by anal-
ogous investments made by their peers. For example, disclosing relative pay information has a
signicant impact on workers' economic output (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 2011, Netessine and
Yakubovich 2012), providing relative performance feedback inuences the academic performance
of high school students (Azmat and Iriberri 2008), and reporting households' relative energy usage
has a signicant eect on energy consumption rates (Schultz et al. 2007). As a consequence, social
comparisons can have a profound impact on outcomes.
1
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Figure 1 Social comparisons to induce energy conservancy.
Note. http://blog.ucsusa.org/smiley-faces-vs-vampires-knowledge-about-power-is-power/. Retrieved on
January 10, 2013.
When making comparisons to others, people may focus on those who perform better (e.g.,
Collins 1996) or those who perform worse (e.g., Wills 1981). In this paper, we distinguish between
two contrasting modes of social comparison. On one hand, people may enjoy utility from over-
performing relative to others, and on the other, people may face disutility from under-performing
relative to others. By our terminology, people may be ahead-seeking or behind-averse. Depending
on the contextual, cultural, or institutional environment, each mode of social comparison may
dominate. For example, in some educational systems, students strive to be at the top of their class
(Stevenson et al., 1990). A student who achieved a perfect score on a test may derive pleasure out
of doing better than other students who scored less; the same perfect score yields less utility if
the entire class has the same achievement. On the contrary, social comparisons induced to reduce
alcohol consumption on college campuses (Lewis and Neighbors 2008) appeal to students' behind-
averse behavior since it is unlikely that any student would enjoy utility gains purely from drinking
less alcohol than reported statistics. In our analysis below, we demonstrate that ahead-seeking
behavior and behind-averse behavior inuence outcomes in signicantly dierent ways.
Central to any social comparison process is the reference structure, which consists of a particular
reference group and specic pieces of information about that group. For example, Figure 1 depicts
an energy bill that benchmarks a customer's energy consumption to its neighbors. Comparisons
could be made across all houses of the neighborhood, or only across houses of similar size. We say
that the reference group is diverse in the former alternative and uniform in the latter alternative.
Diverse reference groups may exert pressure on larger households to conserve as much energy as
smaller households, while uniform reference groups may maintain competitive pressure by placing
everyone on equal footing. Furthermore, notice from Figure 1 that the customer has two reference
points: energy consumption of all its neighbors and of its most ecient neighbors. In general,
the information provided may range from a brief summary statistic such as the group average to
detailed information about every individual in the reference group. We refer to the former as an
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aggregate reference point and the latter as the full reference distribution. A single aggregate statistic
channels each customer's attention onto whether he is more or less ecient relative to the statistic,
whereas the full reference distribution allows for more nuanced comparisons with others who are
more ecient as well as others who are less ecient. Therefore, the diversity of reference groups
(i.e., diverse or uniform) and the granularity of reference points (i.e., aggregate or full) are two key
features that shape the impact of social comparison eects. Our goal in this paper is to understand
how to design the reference structure, dened as a combination of the two features above.
Careful design of the reference structure allows the social planner to inuence individual choices.
People are free to choose, but in the spirit of libertarian paternalism, the social planner plays
the role of a \choice architect" and may seek to align individual choices with social objectives
(Thaler and Sunstein 2008).1In general, we adopt a broad perspective on the notion of a social
planner, which includes service providers, employers, and policy makers. The social planner may
have dierent goals. First, a common objective is to optimize the overall performance of the group.
For instance, a utility company may want households to lower energy consumption, or a rm
may seek high worker productivity. Alternatively, a social planner may wish to \develop stars."
This certainly applies to Ph.D. programs that seek student placement records at top academic
institutions. In contrast, for early-stage education (e.g., levels K-12), governments may opt for the
\no child left behind" ideology and focus on the other end of the distribution; similar sentiments
may prevail in health care services. Aside from performance considerations, a social planner, such
as a service provider (e.g., a yoga teacher), may also care about individual utilities, especially in
settings where customer retention is a direct function of their satisfaction. Finally, fairness concerns
may also matter. For instance, outcomes should be commensurate with ability and eort. Ideally,
the social planner would like to maintain equity and maximize everyone's utility while optimizing
performance.
To explore the ideas above, we develop a static game-theoretic model with complete information
in which each player chooses an output level (e.g., test score). Higher outputs are valuable but
costly to each individual player. Instead of individual decision problems, we have to consider a
noncooperative game between the players because with social comparisons, players' utilities depend
on others' outputs. We undertake a systematic analysis by considering all four combinations of
reference structures, i.e., with an aggregate reference point (based on the group's average output)
or the full reference distribution, and with diverse or uniform reference groups.
1 What people think is best for themselves may diverge from what is objectively best. Examples of time inconsistency
and self-control problems abound in health maintenance (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006) and retirement planning
(Thaler and Benartzi 2004).
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Our results oer guidelines for social planners depending on their objectives and on whether social
comparisons manifest through ahead-seeking or behind-averse behavior. Specically, our analysis
yields three main results. First, we nd that social comparison creates incentives for players to
cluster their outputs together in behind-averse environments and to choose polar extremes (i.e.,
either very high or very low outputs) in ahead-seeking environments. We refer to these eects as
clustering and polarization of outputs.
Second, we show that a social planner can mitigate these social comparison eects by providing
the full reference distribution and/or using more uniform reference groups. The polarization eect
characterizing ahead-seeking environments stimulates over-achievers to perform better but leads
to a worse performance from the under-achievers. In contrast, the clustering eect characterizing
behind-averse environments encourages under-performers to work harder at the expense of the high-
performers shirking in complacency. Depending on whether the social planner seeks to \develop
stars" or to \leave no one behind," it may be more desirable to foster or mitigate those polarization
and clustering eects. In particular, we nd that a social planner who gives greater marginal
weight to larger (smaller) outputs may focus her attention on the top- (bottom-)performing player.
Therefore, the social planner needs to tailor the reference structure to her objective and to the
predominant mode of social comparison.
Third, our results caution that it is never possible to attain perfection on the dimension of
\customer satisfaction." In ahead-seeking environments, measures adopted to stimulate player
output also increase player utility, so there may be complaints against \favoritism" by the players
who derive the least utility and also perform the worst. In behind-averse environments, increases in
equilibrium outputs are accompanied by lower utilities, so players who perform well may not even
be happy in the social planner's \boot camps." In addition, outcomes may be perceived as unfair
and unjust: some players may perform better than others who work harder or others with higher
intrinsic \abilities." Therefore, there are many scenarios in which some players will be dissatised,
and the social planner should be aware of such possibilities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review. Section
3 describes our model and x4 derives the equilibrium outcomes. Sections 5 and 6 discuss output-
oriented and utility-oriented strategies in manipulating reference points. Section 7 considers the
impact of noisy observations of output. Finally, x8 concludes. All proofs appear in Appendix A
and in an electronic companion.
2. Literature Review
Social comparisons have been studied in many domains, such as social psychology, behavioral
economics, and operations management. We next review these streams of literature.
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In a seminal paper, Festinger (1954) proposes that people engage in social comparisons to fulll
their desire for self-evaluation: in the absence of objective standards, people compare themselves
with others to evaluate their own opinions and abilities. Although Festinger's initial theory postu-
lates that people tend to compare themselves with similar others, there is a large body of work on
upward comparisons with others who are better o (e.g., Collins 1996) and downward comparisons
with others who are worse o (e.g., Wills 1981). Both upward and downward comparisons may
generate positive or negative emotions (Buunk et al. 1990). People may focus on similarities or
dierences (Brewer and Weber 1994) and may try to identify with targets of upward comparison
but contrast against targets of downward comparisons (Lockwood et al. 2002). Social compar-
isons are in fact important drivers of one's happiness (Baucells and Sarin 2012). In this paper, we
attempt to capture the above aspects of social comparison processes. By considering ahead-seeking
and behind-averse preferences, we incorporate both upward and downward social comparisons and
accommodate both positive and negative eects on utility. A comprehensive introduction to the
literature on social comparisons can be found in Wood (1989) and Suls and Wheeler (2000).
In behavioral economics, there is a large body of work on social preferences. People exhibit
social preferences when they care not only about material self-interest, but also about the economic
outcomes of others. One prominent area of research on social preferences is in fairness and inequity
aversion. People view disparities as unfair and seek to minimize them. This can be modeled using
utility functions that penalize agents when their outcomes deviate from others' (e.g., Fehr and
Schmidt 1999, Charness and Rabin 2002) or when their shares of the total pie deviate from the equal
allocation benchmark (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). Our model corresponds to the above in
behind-averse environments, where agents who are behind aim to minimize disparities from others
who are better; however, in ahead-seeking environments, agents who are ahead aim to increase
dierences by being further ahead. Another broad type of social preferences arises when people's
well-being depend directly on others' payos. This dependence may be positive for altruists or
negative for spiteful or envious individuals (see Andreoni 1990, Levine 1998). Consistent with
spiteful behavior but contrary to altruistic behavior, our utility model implies that one is never
better o when others' outcomes are improved; however, our results carry distinct interpretations
from the behavioral underpinnings of altruism and spite. Nevertheless, we adopt a reference-based
approach (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), similar to many models above, in which everyone else in
the group serves as a separate and endogenous reference point.
Social comparisons lead individuals to benchmark their performance to their peers. Kandel
and Lazear (1992) develop a general model of peer pressure and show that peer eects improve
performance in partnerships, consistent with Festinger's idea that \a person who runs more slowly
than others with whom he compares himself ... may spend considerable time practising running.
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In a similar situation where the ability in question is intelligence, the person may study harder"
(Festinger 1954, p. 126). There is a stream of literature that provides empirical evidence for peer
eects on labor productivity. In a laboratory experiment, Falk and Ichino (2006) show that peer
eects increase productivity even when subjects were paid independently of their work output. Mas
and Moretti (2009) use high-frequency scanner data to show that the productivity of supermarket
cashiers increases when highly productive personnel is introduced into the same shift. Blanes i
Vidal and Nossol (2011) report an increase in productivity after workers who were paid piece rates
receive information about their own rank in the distribution of pay (and thus productivity). In
a eld experiment with a Dutch retail chain, Delfgaauw et al. (2012) nd that merely providing
rank information about relative sales performance at the store level led to an approximately 5%
increase in sales growth; interestingly, adding monetary incentives did not generate any further
improvement. Consistent with the above ndings, we consider a model in which social comparisons
lead to increased performance.
However, there is some evidence that social comparisons may also lead to decreased performance.
For example, Bandiera et al. (2012) nd that the productivity of teams of fruit pickers declines when
team rankings are revealed. The negative impact arises because the introduction of rank incentives
induced individuals to team up with partners of similar abilities, thereby skewing the distribution of
team performance. Similarly, Barankay (2012) reports that rank feedback is associated with lower
performance among furniture salespeople. Here, the negative eect is primarily due to agents' lack
of knowledge about how much eort is required to achieve a certain rank, leading to demoralization
in case one's performance is lower than expected. The eects above are arguably the most prominent
in ordinal comparisons since dierences in ranks are not representative of the magnitude of the
dierence in outputs. However, in this paper, we focus on cardinal rather than ordinal comparisons.
Incentive mechanisms based on relative performance evaluation have been widely studied. In
labor economics, Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that rank-order tournaments are a useful alterna-
tive to piece-rate contracts when output cannot be directly or eciently measured. Rosen (1986)
extend these ideas to multiple rounds of elimination tournaments and show that in order to main-
tain performance incentives for survivors at every round, prizes for top ranks need to be very
large, akin to CEO salaries. In operations management, Siemsen et al. (2007) show that relative
performance evaluations are desirable when the outcomes of dierent tasks assigned to dierent
agents are linked. In behavioral economics, Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011) study rank feedback
in the absence of explicit nancial incentives, noting that this is akin to tournaments without prizes
where workers compete for relative position and the resulting productivity gain is achieved at no
cost to the rm. In a similar vein, we do not consider nancial incentives in this paper.
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There is abundant evidence on the impact of social comparisons in a wide range of application
areas, including academic performance (Blanton et al. 1999, Azmat and Iriberri 2010), energy
conservancy (Schultz et al. 2007, Ayres et al. 2012, Delmas and Lessem 2012), curbside recycling
(Schultz 1998), and binge drinking (Lewis and Neighbors 2008); see Thaler and Sunstein (2008)
for other applications. By and large, the studies above are concerned about the aggregate eect
of social comparisons. In contrast, by identifying the clustering and polarization eects of social
comparisons, we focus on the dispersion (or variance) of outcomes across individuals. Furthermore,
the reference structure considered in existing papers is often study-specic and xed at the outset.
For instance, in energy conservancy programs, Schultz et al. (2007) report only the aggregate energy
usage and do not appear to control for house size, whereas Ayres et al. (2012) provide electricity
use statistics of \ecient neighbors" and \comparable neighbors." Taking a dierent approach, we
consider a variety of reference structures and study their eect on output dispersion.
Notably, our research question diers by considering social comparisons as a mechanism that
must be designed, or engineered. Social comparisons act in reference to some benchmark, and we
posit that a social planner may have some exibility regarding how to set that benchmark. The
importance of framing reference points has been well documented both in laboratory experiments
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and in natural experiments (Hossain and List 2012). Similarly, the
mechanism design question in our paper can be viewed as setting up the appropriate reference
points for social comparison. To our knowledge, this theme has been explored by two papers. First,
in a laboratory setting, Kuhnen and Tymula (2012) nd that organizations can improve employee
productivity by providing feedback about relative rankings. Moreover, people with high ranks work
harder over time but people at the bottom do not improve as much, suggesting that the latter
should be assigned to new reference groups. The authors conjecture that there exists an optimal
feedback policy but do not characterize it; we take on this task in this paper. Second, Carrell et al.
(2013) conduct a eld experiment with entering freshmen at the United States Air Force Academy.
Using an assignment algorithm that was intended to maximize academic achievement, low-ability
students were placed into squadrons with a high fraction of high-ability students. However, endoge-
nous sorting of low and high ability students into separate social networks resulted in decreased
performance relative to the control where students were randomly assigned. Although the outcome
was negative, the results point to the importance of designing an optimal mechanism to reap the full
benets of peer eects. In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to facilitate mechanism
design for social comparisons.
In operations management, there is a handful of papers on the theme of social comparisons. Loch
and Wu (2008) use laboratory experiments with human subjects to show that prot comparisons
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between a retailer and a manufacturer in a supply chain can lead them to deviate from prot-
maximizing decisions, and surprisingly, Cui et al. (2007) show that when such comparisons are
in eect, the simple wholesale price contract can coordinate the supply chain. Recently, Avc
et al. (2012) studied the eect of social comparisons between two newsvendors and established
results analogous to our clustering and polarization eects. So far, this literature has studied
social comparisons between a pair of players, and our paper takes a step toward exploring social
comparisons within a group of players. In group environments, there is more than one possible
target of comparison, and we study how the social planner should actively inuence the reference
structure through an appropriate choice of reference groups and reference points.
In line with the recent interest in modeling consumer behavior (e.g., Shen and Su 2007; Netessine
and Tang 2009), there are several papers that study how comparative eects between consumers
can drive operational practices. Tereyagoglu and Veeraraghavan (2012) analyze production deci-
sions when consumers engaging in conspicuous consumption value exclusivity (i.e., when others
are excluded from consumption), while Veeraraghavan and Debo (2011) study the queueing impli-
cations of herding behavior (i.e., when others also join in consumption). Similar to the above, our
paper joins the operations management literature and explores the impact of social comparisons.
Finally, a stream of research in operations management studies reference eects that arise when
people look back at past outcomes. In particular, Popescu and Wu (2007) and Nasiry and Popescu
(2011) study dynamic pricing strategies with reference eects, respectively when the reference
price smoothly \acclimates" to price changes and when it is based on the \peak-end" history of
prices. Aaki and Popescu (2010) study how to manage long-term relationships when customers'
satisfaction adapts to past service experiences, and Caro and Martinez-de-Albeniz (2012) consider
pricing and product design decisions with satiation eects. In contrast to these studies, we focus on
social contexts where reference points are endogenously determined by the actions of other players.
3. Model
Let us rst consider an individual player i who must choose a particular output xi. Higher out-
puts are valuable but come at a cost. For example, students can learn the course material better
by working harder, and athletes can attain a higher level of prociency by training harder. We
summarize all costs and benets using a strictly concave (net) value function Vi(xi), so there is a
unique output level that maximizes net value.
Next, let us consider a group of n players. Players have a tendency to compare their outputs
relative to others.2 Let x0 be some reference output. We consider two modes of social comparisons.
2Alternatively, players may compare other performance metrics ~xi such as rewards or costs increasing in the output
xi. We can adapt our model to this case by assuming that players choose ~xi directly. The same analysis applies as
long as players' net value is concave in ~xi.
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First, each player i may face disutility from achieving a lower output compared to x0. In this case,
we model the utility function of player i following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as
Ui(xi) = Vi(xi) 0[x0 xi]+;
in which [x]+ max(x;0). For every unit of output that player i is behind the reference point, the
corresponding disutility is 0  0. In this case, we refer to the term 0[x0 xi]+ as the behind-loss
and we say that player i is behind-averse. Alternatively, player i may enjoy increased utility from
achieving a higher output compared to x0. The corresponding utility function of player i is
Ui(xi) = Vi(xi)+0[xi x0]+:
Similar to above, player i enjoys utility of 0  0 for every unit of output higher than the reference
point. Here, we refer to the term 0[xi x0]+ as the ahead-gain and we say that player i is ahead-
seeking. Without loss of generality, we assume that each player is either purely ahead-seeking or
purely behind-averse.3 In this model, utility gains or losses on top of the net value function Vi(xi)
are brought about by social comparisons relative to a reference point x0.
The social planner can actively inuence the reference point x0 for social comparisons. A natural
candidate for x0 is the average output of the group x 
P
j xj=n. This is commonly observed in
many applications (e.g., Figure 1). We model this case by using x0 = x and setting 0 = n;0 = n
to reect the fact that this aggregate reference point is based on the choices of all n players. In
other words, the utility functions for ahead-seeking and behind-averse players are respectively
U
(a)
i (xi;x i) = Vi(xi)+n  [xi  x]+ and U (a)i (xi;x i) = Vi(xi) n  [x xi]+;
where we write Ui(xi;x i) to emphasize the dependence on player i's utility on others' outputs
and its superscript refers to whether players are ahead-seeking (`') or behind-averse (`') and to
the fact that they receive an aggregate reference point (`a').
Alternatively, the social planner can stimulate social comparisons relative to a full reference
distribution (`f ') by making the individual outputs of each player readily available. We model
this case by assuming that each individual output is a separate reference point and the associated
parameters are 0 = ;0 = . In other words, the utility functions are, respectively for ahead-
seeking and behind-averse players,
U
(f)
i (xi;x i) = Vi(xi)+
X
j
[xi xj]+ and U (f)i (xi;x i) = Vi(xi) 
X
j
[xj  xi]+:
3Although ahead-seeking and behind-averse behaviors are distinct psychological phenomena, this framework can
potentially model individuals as having both ahead-seeking (0 > 0) and behind-averse (0 > 0) preferences. Any
player with 0 >0 can be modeled as purely ahead-seeking, and vice versa.
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Our analysis will study how the granularity of reference points interacts with social comparisons
by contrasting these two extreme cases.
At a higher level, the social planner can inuence the composition of the reference group. Should
the reference group be diverse or uniform? To address this question, we consider two player types,
=A;B.4 All type- players have identical preferences and possess the value function V(). Further,
we assume that V 0A(x+k) = V
0
B(x). Given the same marginal value, a type-A player is thus naturally
predisposed to achieve k more units of output than a type-B player. For brevity, we drop the
subscript and write VB(x) V (x). The utility of a type- player i is denoted by U;i(xi;x i). Let n
denote the number of players of type  in a reference group of size n, so nA+nB = n. We say that
a group is uniform if all members are of the same type and diverse otherwise. In our equilibrium
characterization, we consider diverse groups with arbitrary values of nA > 0 and nB > 0. However
in x5, in order to study the impact of group diversity while keeping group size constant,5 we will
contrast the following two setups: (i) two diverse reference groups, each consisting of nA = n=2
type-A and nB = n=2 type-B players, and (ii) two uniform reference groups, one with n type-A
players and another with n type-B players. In either setup, the social planner serves two sections of
n players and there are n players of each type. For instance, a professor could teach two sections of
the same class to a hybrid population of master and undergraduate students, or teach one section
to master students and one section to undergraduate students. Customers make social comparisons
within their group but not across groups, so we analyze the player-game separately for each group.
Our analysis considers two dierent environments: in ahead-seeking environments, all players are
ahead-seeking, while in behind-averse environments, all players are behind-averse.6 The parameter
 0 in an ahead-seeking environment or   0 in a behind-averse environment is common across
every player and represents the strength of the social comparison eects in the particular context.
In summary, we consider eight dierent game congurations, depending on whether players are
ahead-seeking or behind-averse, whether they have an aggregate reference point or a full reference
distribution, and whether their reference group is uniform or diverse. For each conguration, we
formulate a static game with complete information.7 In this game, all players i= 1; : : : ; n simulta-
neously choose an output xi, following which all outputs are observed and players receive payos
4 The denomination of types has been chosen in reference to the letter grades in academic contexts given the prevalence
of social comparisons in education (Blanton et al. 1999, Azmat and Iriberri 2010).
5 The eect of group size on social comparisons is in general indeterminate. For instance, Bond (2005) concludes from
a meta-analysis that the eect of majority size on conformity can be either positive or negative.
6 There may be situations with both ahead-seeking and behind-averse players in the same reference group. We
characterize the equilibrium arising from such a situation in Appendix B.1 and show that the fundamental insights
obtained with the extreme cases remain preserved.
7Our one-shot game is a simplication that ignores dynamic reference eects. For example, people may change their
behavior in response to how they compared to peers in the past or to achieve more favorable relative standings in the
future. In steady state, where everyone has full information (or rational expectations) about other's outputs, these
dynamic considerations collapse into the static comparisons in our model.
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according to the utility functions Ui(xi;x i) specied above. We solve for the pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium x such that xi = argmaxxi Ui(xi;x

 i). These equilibrium outputs reect how players
will behave in the presence of social comparison eects.
Without loss of generality, we restrict the strategy sets of each type- player to an interval
[L;R]. To see this, consider an ahead-seeking (resp. behind-averse) type- player i and suppose
that there are ~ni other players with lower (resp. higher) outputs. Let us denote player i's best
response by C (~ni) (resp. C

 (~ni)), which is increasing in ~ni. For instance with the full reference
distribution, an ahead-seeking player i's best response solves V 0 (xi)+ ~ni= 0 (i.e., the rst-order
condition). Since there are n players in the reference group, ~ni must be between 0 and n   1.
Therefore, the best response of any ahead-seeking player must lie between L C (0) and R 
C (n  1) and that of any behind-averse player must lie between L C (0) and R C (n  1).
For brevity, we omit the superscripts and write L;R. We furthermore assume that the strategy
sets of type-A and type-B players do not overlap, i.e., the dierence between player types (k) is so
large that RB <LA.
8 Here, the interpretation is that players of dierent types exhibit large innate
dierences whereas players with small dierences can be pooled into the same type.
Finally, we introduce some notation. We write player outputs in vector notation x= (xB;xA),
in which x = (x;1; : : : ; x;n) for =A;B and each x is sorted in ascending order. We use bars to
denote averages, as in x=
Pn
i=1 xi=n. In the event that all type- players choose the same output,
we use x as a shorthand for their output, i.e., we write x = x instead of x = (x; : : : ; x). Finally,
we use the standard notations [x]+ max(x;0) and 1[x>0] = 1 if x> 0 and zero otherwise.
4. Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we characterize the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outputs x in the game.
To illustrate the following results, consider a cohort with nA = 3 type-A players and nB =
4 type-B players, with value function VB(x) = VA(x + 15) = 100x   x2. All players are either
ahead-seeking or behind-averse with  =  = 5. Under these parameters, type-B players choose
their outputs between LB = 50 and RB = 65, and type-A players choose them between
LA = 70 and RA = 85. When players are ahead-seeking, the equilibrium outcome is x
(a) =
(50;50;50;50;85;85;85) with an aggregate reference point and x(f) = (50;52:5;55;57:5;80;82:5;85)
with the full reference distribution. When players are behind-averse, the equilibrium outcome is
x(a) = (65;65;65;65;70;70;70) with an aggregate reference point and one possible equilibrium
outcome is x(f) = (62:6;62:5;62:5;62:5;73:75;73:75;73:75) with the full reference distribution.
In this example, the equilibrium output is distributed on two points, except when players are
ahead-seeking and receive the full reference distribution, in which case no pair of players chooses
8We relax this assumption in Appendix B.2. The basic analysis in the main text remains qualitatively unchanged.
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the same output. Moreover, the outcome tends to be more clustered when players are behind-averse
and more polarized when they are ahead-seeking, and this clustering or polarization eect is more
heavily pronounced when players have an aggregate reference point than when they have the full
reference distribution. As we show next, these observations tend to hold true in general.
We characterize the equilibrium structure rst for a behind-averse environment and then for
an ahead-seeking environment. In each environment, we rst consider the case where the social
planner sets an aggregate reference point and then the case where the social planner provides the
full reference distribution. Our results hold for general group compositions (with nA type-A players
and nB type-B players) and can be applied to both diverse reference groups (i.e., nA; nB > 0) and
uniform reference groups (either nA = 0 or nB = 0).
Mathematically, the game is supermodular, i.e., outputs are strategic complements, when players
are behind-averse and submodular, i.e., outputs are strategic substitutes, when they are ahead-
seeking. Intuitively, behind-averse players tend to seek \safety in numbers" because they can avoid
falling behind by staying close to their peers' output level. In contrast, ahead-seeking players want
to pull ahead of their peers to enjoy ahead-gains.
We rst consider the case with behind-averse players. We present our results in two separate
propositions, rst with an aggregate reference point and then with the full reference distribution.
Proposition 1. Suppose players are behind-averse and have an aggregate reference point.
(i) If nA  1 and nB  1, there is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with xA =LA; xB =RB.
(ii) If n = n, then for any z 2 [C (0);C (n  1)], x = z is a Nash equilibrium.
When players are behind-averse and have an aggregate reference point, they thus choose their
outputs at the inner boundaries of their action spaces when the group is diverse. Referring back
to the introductory numerical example, x(a) = (65;65;65;65;70;70;70).
Proposition 2. Suppose players are behind-averse and have the full reference distribution. For
any zA 2 [CA(0);CA(nA 1)] and zB 2 [CB(nA);CB(n 1)], xA = zA; xB = zB is a Nash equilibrium.
In Propositions 1(ii) and 2 above, there are multiple equilibria. For such cases, we shall
use standard risk-dominance arguments to focus on one particular equilibrium.9 Specically,
the selected equilibrium in Proposition 1(ii) satises V 0 (x) + (n   1)=2 = 0; and the
selected equilibrium in Proposition 2 satises V 0A(xA) + (nA   1)=2 = 0 and V 0B(xB) + nA +
9When the state space is restricted to be discrete, the proposed equilibrium turns out to be 1=2-dominant (Kajii and
Morris 1997) and, if nA = 0, the unique u-dominant equilibrium (Kojima 2006). These dominance concepts extend the
risk-dominance concept to n-player games with m> 2 actions and share some of its axiomatic foundations axiomatic
(Harsanyi and Selten 1988) and stability properties (Kojima 2006). In x7, we also show that, when performance
metrics are noisy, the equilibrium converges to this selected equilibrium as the noise tends to zero.
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(nB   1)=2 = 0. In the introductory numerical example, that selected equilibrium is x(f) =
(62:6;62:5;62:5;62:5;73:75;73:75;73:75).
Now, we turn to ahead-seeking players. Although existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
is in general not guaranteed in submodular games (Vives 1999), we establish its existence in our
model. Similar to above, we consider rst the case with an aggregate reference point and then the
case with the full reference distribution.
The next proposition shows that, with an aggregate reference point, the equilibrium outputs
of ahead-seeking players are polarized at the two extreme ends: L and R. In the introductory
numerical example, x(a) = (50;50;50;50;85;85;85).
Proposition 3. Suppose players are ahead-seeking and have an aggregate reference point. There
is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, in which m type- players choose L and n  m
of the remaining type- players choose R, for  = A;B. There exist constants l 2 [LB;RB] and
r 2 [LA;RB] (so LB < l <RB <LA < r <RA) such that:
(i) If nARA+nBLB
n
2 [LB; l), then mA = 0 and mB 2 [1; nB   1].
(ii) If nARA+nBLB
n
2 (l; r), then mA = 0 and mB = nB.
(iii) If nARA+nBLB
n
2 (r;RA], then mA 2 [1; nA  1] and mB = nB.
In particular when the reference group consists of an equal number of each type of players (i.e.,
when nA = nB = n=2), Proposition 3(ii) shows that all type-A players choose RA and all type-B
players choose LB in equilibrium. There is thus polarization of outputs at the two extremes. This
phenomenon persists even when the reference group is uniform. For example, when nB = n and
nA = 0, Proposition 3(i) shows that polarization occurs within the action set of the representative
type because some players choose the lowest possible output (LB) while the remaining players
choose the highest possible output (RB).
Next, we consider the case in which social comparisons are based on the full reference distribution.
In that case, it turns out that no pair of players chooses the same output (see Lemma A-4 in
Appendix A). In the introductory numerical example, x(f) = (50;52:5;55;57:5;80;82:5;85). The
intuition is as follows: Suppose that it is optimal for a player to choose output z and be ahead of
` other players. Then, it is not optimal for any other player to choose the same output z and also
be ahead of ` players since choosing an innitesimally smaller output would increase her utility by
increasing her value (since V 0(z)< 0) while remaining ahead of ` players.
Proposition 4. Suppose players are ahead-seeking and have the full reference distribution.
There is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium x satisfying V 0A(x

A;i) + (nB + i   1) = 0 for
i= 1; : : : ; nA; and V
0
B(x

B;i)+ (i  1)= 0 for i= 1; : : : ; nB.
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Figure 2 Equilibrium outputs in a behind-averse environment.
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Ahead-seeking players thus tend to spread their outputs with the full reference distribution.
Whereas type-B players tend to choose outputs near the lower boundary of their strategy space
(LB), type-A players choose outputs near the upper boundary of their strategy space (RA). Within
a given type, players tend to spread their outputs uniformly.
The results of Propositions 1-4 are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, respectively for the cases of
behind-averse and ahead-seeking players. We consider two sections of size n. With diverse reference
groups, each section consists of an equal number of type-A and type-B players (i.e., nA = nB = n=2).
With uniform reference groups, section 1 consists of n type-A players and section 2 consists of n
type-B players. Each plot shows a histogram of the players' outputs in equilibrium: Each circle
represents a single player's output choice. Circles are stacked on top of one another when multiple
players choose the same output. When players choose dierent outputs, circles are spread apart
horizontally. Equilibrium choices are shown relative to the bounds L and R.
Comparing Figures 2 and 3 reveals that outputs tend to be clustered together in behind-averse
environments and polarized in ahead-seeking environments, consistent with the super- or submod-
ular nature of the corresponding game. In Appendix B, we show that these equilibrium structural
results remain valid when the reference group consists of both ahead-seeking and behind-averse
types, and when the strategy sets of type-A and type-B players overlap. Specically, we nd that
behind-averse players tend to cluster together; and if the strategy sets of type-A and type-B play-
ers overlap, all behind-averse players across all types choose the same output. We also nd that
ahead-seeking players always choose polarized outputs generally anchored at the upper boundary
of the action set for type-A players and the lower boundary of the action set for type-B players,
with or without dispersion depending on whether they have the full reference distribution or an
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Figure 3 Equilibrium outputs in an ahead-seeking environment.
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aggregate reference point. Hence, the insights obtained with our base model carry over to more
complex settings.
In addition, the gures reveal that the clustering eect when players are behind-averse and the
polarization eect when they are ahead-seeking are the strongest when comparisons are based
on an aggregate reference point obtained from a diverse reference group (i.e., top-left corner of
each gure). This setting corresponds, in a way, to the simplest setting for the social planner. In
comparison, the other settings require more eort from the social planner, such as classifying players
according to their types to create uniform reference groups, or publishing the full vector of outputs
to provide a full reference distribution. By taking these additional measures, the social planner can
mitigate the clustering and polarization eects induced by social comparison. Henceforth, we use
the term reference structure to refer to each of the four settings shown in Figures 2 and 3.
5. Output-Focused Strategies
Which reference structure should the social planner choose if she is concerned about players'
outputs? The answer depends on her objective function. In this section, we assume that the social
planner's objective is increasing and additively separable in output. Formally, we denote the social
planner's objective as
Pn
i=1W (xi), in which W (x) is nondecreasing. We rst consider the case
where W (x) is linear, i.e., the social planner maximizes the total output, assuming a quadratic
value function V (x).10
10 In Appendix B.3.2, a numerical study shows that the equilibrium structures described in Propositions 1-4 remain
valid for a wide range of value functions V (x). In the subsequent analysis, we sometimes focus, for the sake of
tractability, on the representative case of a quadratic value function.
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Proposition 5 (Total Output). Suppose that the value function is quadratic. Then, the social
planner, maximizing the total output (
PnA
i=1 xA;i+
PnB
i=1 xB;i), should provide an aggregate reference
point in ahead-seeking environments and provide the full reference distribution in behind-averse
environments if and only if nA  nB; and, she is indierent about the level of diversity of the
reference group.
The above proposition shows that by manipulating the reference point granularity, the social
planner can inuence total output in groups. On the other hand, the composition of the reference
group does not matter.
We can compare the equilibrium outputs of individual players using the results from Propositions
1-4. We nd that in ahead-seeking environments, the outputs of type-A (type-B) players are higher
(lower) with an aggregate reference point than with the full reference distribution, and with diverse
reference groups than with uniform reference groups; the above results are reversed in behind-
averse environments. See Figures 2 and 3 for an illustration. Therefore, the reference structure
has a dierent impact on the outputs of each player type, as summarized in Table 1. (Details
are provided in Lemmas A-5 and A-6 in Appendix A.) Observe that the level of granularity of
information that maximizes total output is the same as the one that maximizes the outputs of
players who are in majority. For instance, in ahead-seeking environments, setting an aggregate
reference point maximizes the total output when nA  nB and it also maximizes the output of
type-A players. Hence, majority rules.
Table 1 Reference structures that maximize the output of type- players
Objective Ahead-seeking environment Behind-averse environment
To increase xA: diverse ref. group, aggregate ref. point uniform ref. group, full ref. distribution
To increase xB: uniform ref. group, full ref. distribution diverse ref. group, aggregate ref. point
To illustrate that result, consider a charity that wants to encourage donations. Consistent with
the \warm glow eect" (Andreoni 1990), the predominant mode of social comparison is ahead-
seeking. Moreover, the charity faces more median-income (type-B) than high-income (type-A)
potential donors, by the Pareto law of wealth distribution. According to Proposition 5, the charity
should provide nely-grained information about the distribution of donations (while respecting
donors' privacy) such as categorizing donations into tiers (McCardle et al. 2009).
Apart from equally considering all players' outputs, the social planner could pursue other objec-
tives and give more weight to either the highest or the lowest outputs. In particular, the social
planner may care more about the extremes, such as the upper or lower tails of the distribution of
player outputs. We model such considerations using either a convex objective functionW (x), which
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emphasizes the importance of the right tail, or a concave objective functionW (x), which emphasizes
the importance of the left tail. When W (x) is convex, the social planner (e.g., a tennis academy)
benets more from developing a few \stars" (e.g., tennis champions) than from marginally raising
the output level of a large pool of low-performing players. By contrast when W (x) is concave, the
social planner (e.g., a public school) benets more from leaving no one behind, making sure that all
players (e.g., pupils) achieve a minimum level of output (e.g., basic level on a standardized test).
The next proposition shows that, despite pursuing a global objective over all outputs, i.e.,P
iW (xi), the planner can focus her attention on one type of players only.
Proposition 6 (Tail-End Outputs). Suppose the value function is quadratic and nA = nB.
Further, suppose the social planner maximizes
PnA
i=1W (xA;i)+
PnB
i=1W (xB;i).
(i) If W (x) is convex, the social planner should provide aggregate reference points from diverse
reference groups in ahead-seeking environments and provide the full reference distributions from
uniform reference groups in behind-averse environments.
(ii) If W (x) is concave, the social planner should provide aggregate reference points from diverse
reference groups in behind-averse environments and provide the full reference distributions from
uniform reference groups in ahead-seeking environments.
The social planner will thus choose the reference structure in a way that maximizes the outputs
of type-A players when her payo function is convex; and in a way that maximizes the outputs
of type-B players when her payo function is concave (cf. Table 1). Eectively, the social planner
can focus on maximizing the output of the best player (maxmaxi xi), i.e., on \developing a star,"
or on maximizing the output of the worst player (maxmini xi), i.e., on \leaving no one behind,"
without consideration of the other players' outputs depending on whether her objective function
W (x) is convex or concave.
As an illustration of Proposition 6, let us consider the social comparisons prevailing in elementary
education in Asia and in the United States. The notorious competitiveness in Asian cultures is
more consistent with the ahead-seeking behavior whereas Americans tend to be afraid of falling
into the traps of \unhealthy competition," making children unduly anxious, consistent with the
behind-averse behavior.11 The objective of the social planner (i.e., the school or the government) is
however likely to be concave under either system given the early stage of elementary education.12
11 Stevenson et al. (1990, p. 79) report that \having their child near the mean was sucient for the American mothers
to be satised; having a child above the mean was more often a requirement for mothers in Taipei and Sendai."
12 In particular, Stevenson et al. (1990, p. 25) argue that in developed countries such as the U.S., China, and especially
Japan, \the goal of [elementary] education is to reduce individual dierences among children." By contrast, Duo et
al. (2011) argue that for such developing countries as Kenya, the teachers' objective function may be convex in the
students' performance.
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Hence, the way a social planner should set the reference structure should be adapted to the mode of
social comparison. Asian classes indeed tend to be streamed by \student quality," fostering greater
group uniformity, and grades are usually fully revealed to all; whereas, U.S. classes are seldom
streamed until much later, keeping them diverse, and grades are not typically publicized. These
observations appear consistent with the recommendations of Proposition 6.
6. Utility-Focused Strategies
Instead of (or in addition to) caring about output, social planners could care about the players'
well-being. In this section, we adopt the perspective of the players and assess their satisfaction
under the dierent game settings. In contrast to the previous section, which demonstrated an
alignment between the social planner's objective and the outputs of one type of players, maximizing
player satisfaction is not without tensions.
We rst study the impact of reference points on individual utilities. As shown in Lemma A-7
in Appendix A, type-A players prefer diverse reference groups and type-B players prefer uniform
reference groups irrespective of whether they are behind-averse or ahead-seeking. Intuitively, type-
A players prefer being part of a diverse group to arm their superiority whereas type-B players
prefer being part of a uniform group to avoid being compared to players with greater innate ability.
The impact of reference point granularity on player utility is more ambiguous. Specically,
Lemma A-8 in Appendix A shows that when the value function is quadratic and nA = n=2, type-
A players always prefer aggregate reference points. By contrast, type-B players prefer aggregate
reference points when they are behind-averse and full reference distributions otherwise.
Table 2 Reference structures that maximize the utilities of type- players when nA = nB and when the value
function is quadratic
Objective Ahead-seeking environment Behind-averse environment
To increase UA: diverse ref. group, aggregate ref. point diverse ref. group, aggregate ref. point
To increase UB: uniform ref. group, full ref. distribution uniform ref. group, aggregate ref. point
These results, summarized in Table 2, reveal that the preferences of type-A and type-B players
are often misaligned. For example, a social planner seeking to please type-A players in an ahead-
seeking environment would set aggregate reference points obtained from a diverse reference group,
although type-B players would prefer full reference distributions based on uniform reference groups.
Comparing Tables 1 and 2 reveals that the alignment between output maximization and utility
maximization depends on the mode of social comparison at work. In an ahead-seeking environment,
the reference structure that maximizes the output of a particular type of players is the same as
the one that maximizes their utility. Consequently, this reference structure will allow one type of
Roels and Su: Optimal Design of Social Comparison Eects
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. 19
players to enjoy both high output and high utility, whereas the other type of players will achieve
low performance and experience low utility. In this way, ahead-seeking behavior leads to favoritism.
By contrast when players are behind-averse, output maximization is not aligned with utility
maximization. When maximizing the output of one particular type of players, the social planner
may encounter dissatisfaction from that same type of players. Such environments may resemble
boot camps, where high output is accompanied by poor satisfaction.
Instead of focusing on one particular type of players, the social planner could aim at maximizing
the total utility. The following proposition shows that total utility is higher with diverse reference
groups when players are ahead-seeking and with uniform reference groups otherwise.
Proposition 7 (Total Utility). Suppose that the value function is quadratic. Then, the social
planner, maximizing total utility (
PnA
i=1UA;i +
PnB
i=1UB;i), should use diverse reference groups in
ahead-seeking environments and uniform reference groups in behind-averse environments; with
these optimal reference groups, she is indierent about the level of granularity of the reference point.
Is total utility maximization consistent with total output maximization? Comparing Propositions
5 and 7 reveals that reference group diversity aects total utility, but not total output, whereas
reference point granularity aects total output, but not total utility (at least when reference groups
are optimally chosen). Consequently, it is possible for the social planner to simultaneously max-
imize total output and total utility, by adopting the appropriate combination of reference point
granularity and group diversity. Although \the best of both worlds" is a theoretical possibility, we
caution that the social planner may end up with a reference structure that displeases all players
in some way. For example, in ahead-seeking environments with a majority of type-B players, the
social planner could choose diverse reference groups (which type-B players dislike) to maximize
total utility and disclose individual performance (which type-A players dislike) to maximize total
output. Preferences are so misaligned that neither type of players is satised with the choice of
reference structure, even though it jointly maximizes total utility and total output. Worse than
not pleasing everyone, the social planner may thus end up not pleasing anyone.
Is total utility maximization consistent with the goals of a social planner who wishes to \develop
stars" or \leave no one behind"? By comparing Propositions 6 and 7, we observe that maximizing
total utility is aligned with the social planner's objective if it is convex but not when it is concave.
It is indeed ironic that, when the social planner wants to leave no one behind, her most preferred
reference structure may in fact generate the least total utility.
Finally, another important determinant of player satisfaction is equity. Customers do not like to
be treated unfairly. How do we measure or even dene equity? We do not attempt to answer this
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question in this paper. Instead, we restrict our discussion to two \equity principles," which provide
precise guidelines for what we believe constitutes fair treatment of players.
Equity Principle 1 Higher output should reect greater eort.
The rst principle states that output should reect the amount of eort put in. Since players
dier in their intrinsic abilities, their outputs may not correspond to how hard they work. In our
model, the output of type-B players is identical to their eort; however, type-A players need only
to put in x  k units of eort to get output x. This equity principle thus abstracts away from
dierences in ability and states that any output variation should reect dierences in eort.
Although the output of type-A players is always (weakly) greater than the output of type-B
players in our model, it appears from the equilibrium conditions that type-B players exert higher
eort when players are behind-averse (xB  xA   k) and that the opposite holds true when they
are ahead-seeking (xB;i  xA;j   k for all i = 1; : : : ; nB and j = 1; : : : ; nA). Hence, the rst equity
principle is satised in ahead-seeking environments and violated in behind-averse environments.
While the rst principle above requires output to correspond to eort, our second principle of
equity requires output to correspond to ability.
Equity Principle 2 Higher output should reect greater ability.
The second principle states that type-A players, given their greater innate ability, should get
higher output. Moreover, among players of the same type, output should be the same. When all
players share the same type, any output dispersion would indeed not reect their common ability
and could therefore be considered as articial.
From Propositions 1-4, it appears that ahead-seeking behavior leads to an articial dispersion
of outputs since players of the same type end up having dierent outputs. However, behind-averse
behavior ensures that all players of the same type have the same output. Hence, our second equity
principle is satised in behind-averse environments and violated in ahead-seeking environments.
In sum, it will be impossible to simultaneously satisfy both equity principles. In addition to
being unable to please everyone, a social planner will thus have to live with the facts that output
may not reect eort when players are behind-averse and that output may not reect ability when
players are ahead-seeking.13 The violation of these equity principles will be exacerbated when the
social planner measures performance inaccurately, which we examine in the following section.
13 Interestingly, Stevenson et al. (1990, p. 66) report that in elementary education, Asian mothers, who are arguably
more ahead-seeking, tend to associate academic performance with eort whereas American mothers, who are arguably
more behind-averse, tend to associate academic performance with ability. Hence, the mothers' beliefs about academic
performance tend to be biased towards satisfying our two equity principles.
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7. Noisy Performance Metrics
We have assumed so far that the players' outputs were perfectly observable. However in practice,
performance metrics may inaccurately reect output. For instance in education, a score on the nal
exam may inaccurately reect the amount of learning. In this section, we generalize our model to
account for inaccurate performance metrics yi(xi).
Let yi(xi) denote the performance metric of player i's output. For simplicity, we consider additive
noise; that is, yi(xi) = xi + i, with i being normally distributed with mean zero (i.e., E [i] = 0)
and standard deviation , and independent of j, j 6= i. Let (x) be the probability density function
of the standard normal distribution and (x) be its cumulative distribution function. Because
outputs are unobservable, social comparisons bear on the performance metrics.
Similar to x3, the social planner can set the reference point for social comparisons on the average
performance of the group, y(x)Pj yj(xj)=n, thereby creating an aggregate reference point. In
that case, the utility functions for ahead-seeking or behind-averse players are respectively:
U
(a)
i (xi;x i) = Vi(xi)+n E[yi(xi)  y(x)]+ and U (a)i (xi;x i) = Vi(xi) n E[y(x)  yi(xi)]+:
Alternatively, the social planner can provide the full reference distribution so as to induce social
comparisons on individual performances. In that case, the utility functions are, respectively for
ahead-seeking and behind-averse players,
U
(f)
i (xi;x i) = Vi(xi)+
X
j
E[yi(xi) yj(xj)]+ and U (f)i (xi;x i) = Vi(xi) 
X
j
E[yj(xj) yi(xi)]+:
When players are behind-averse, there is a unique equilibrium (see Proposition A-1 in Appendix
A). Moreover when ! 0, the equilibrium coincides with the selected equilibrium in xx5-6.14
By contrast when players are ahead-seeking, establishing the existence of an equilibrium turns out
to be more complicated because the game is submodular, for which little theory exists (Vives 1999).
Existence of an equilibrium can be however guaranteed with an aggregate reference point since the
game is in that case aggregative (Kukushkin 2004). Moreover, Proposition A-2 in Appendix A shows
that (i) when ! 0, there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and that equilibrium is
identical to the equilibria presented in Propositions 3 and 4; and, (ii) when  is large, there exists
a Nash equilibrium in which all players of the same type choose the same output.
The model with noisy performance metrics thus naturally reduces to our base model presented
in x3 when the noise () tends to zero. More interestingly, when the noise is very large, the eect of
social comparison persists, both when players are behind-averse and when they are ahead-seeking,
14 The noisy performance framework provides another justication for selecting that particular equilibrium in xx5-6
beyond risk dominance and stochastic stability.
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Figure 4 Equilibrium outputs when players are ahead-seeking and belong to a diverse reference group
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Note. The equilibria are reached through a sequential ta^tonnement process, starting from x = (V
0
 )
 1
( (n  1)=2),
=A;B. The parameters are: VB(x) = 100x x2, VA(x+k) = VB(x), k= 6, = 2, nA = nB = 3. Type-A and type-B
players are respectively represented with a `+' and a `' markers. The size of each marker is proportional to the
number of players choosing that particular output.
in the sense that the equilibrium output exceeds the maximizer of V(x). However, the dispersion
in outputs among players of the same type completely vanishes when the performance metric is
very noisy. Intuitively, the performance metric is so noisy that there is a high chance that any over-
investment in output will not translate into higher performance, therefore making such investment
unattractive.
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of the equilibrium outcomes with ahead-seeking players as 
increases. For a range of small values of , the equilibrium outcomes are identical to the ones char-
acterized in x4 for the case of accurate performance metrics. As  further increases, the equilibrium
changes to gradually converge to the equilibrium characterized in Proposition A-2(ii) in Appendix
A. Throughout that process, the structure of the equilibrium remains stable, the outputs being
accumulated in a two-point distribution with an aggregate reference point and being more evenly
spread within players of the same type with the full reference distribution.
With only one uniform reference group, some structural results can be obtained for the inter-
mediate values of . (The proofs are omitted for brevity.) With an aggregate reference point,
one can show the existence of an equilibrium when n is even and V (x) is quadratic such that
x1 = : : := xn2 and xn2+1 = : : := xn. That is, we expect the two-point nature of the output distri-
bution to be preserved, but the two points to get closer to each other as  increases. With the
full reference distribution, one can show the existence of an equilibrium x when n= 3 and V (x)
is quadratic, such that x2 = (x1 + x3)=2 when V
00(x)=   0:3182 and such that x1 = x2  x3
when V 00(x)= 0:5658. That is, we expect gradual bunching of outputs as  increases. Figure
5 illustrates the evolution of equilibrium outputs in a uniform reference group as  increases.
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Figure 5 Equilibrium outputs when players are ahead-seeking and belong to a uniform reference group
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Note. The equilibria are reached through a sequential ta^tonnement process, starting from x= (V 0) 1 ( (n  1)=2).
The parameters are: V (x) = 100x x2, = 2, n= 6. The size of each marker is proportional to the number of players
choosing that particular output.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we study how social planners can manipulate reference points and reference groups
to make full use of social comparison eects. We conclude that the optimal reference structure
depends critically on the mode of social comparison eect at work: our recommendations for ahead-
seeking environments (where players derive pleasure from being ahead of others) and behind-averse
environments (where players dislike being behind others) can be starkly dierent. Specically, we
nd that the polarization eect induced by ahead-seeking behavior and the clustering eect induced
by behind-averse behavior are the strongest when the planner uses diverse reference groups with an
aggregate reference point, but can be mitigated with uniform reference groups and/or full reference
distributions. Our analysis provides precise answers that depend on the social planner's objectives.
However, we caution that player dissatisfaction often arises because it is seldom possible to please
everyone or to treat everyone equitably.
Although considered xed in our paper, the mode of social comparisons can sometimes be manip-
ulated by the social planner. By publicly recognizing winners or losers, the social planner can
accentuate the ahead-seeking or behind-averse character of the comparisons. The social planner
may try to elicit ahead-seeking sentiments in high-performing players (so they strive to be even
better) and behind-averse sentiments in low-performance players (so they try to keep up). In addi-
tion, the social planner can try to amplify the strength of social comparison eects, e.g., by adding
injunctive messages (e.g., sad or smiley faces; see Schultz et al. 2007) to descriptive messages.
Social comparisons can be ordinal rather than cardinal. For example, a social planner could
provide information about relative ranks, such as categorical feedback (e.g., course grades), without
disclosing the absolute performances. With ordinal comparisons, the player game in our model may
resemble a Bertrand game, potentially leading to no pure-strategy equilibrium or, in the words of
Festinger (1954), no \state of social quiescence."
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Table A-1 Equilibrium rst-order conditions.
Environment Ref. pt. granularity Diverse group of size n= nA+nB Uniform group of size n, =A;B
Behind-averse
Aggregate point
V 0A

x
(a2)
A

= 0 V 0A

x
(a1)
A

+ nA 1
2
= 0
V 0B

x
(a2)
B

+(n  1) = 0 V 0B

x
(a1)
B

+ nB 1
2
= 0
Full distribution
V 0A

x
(f2)
A

+ nA 1
2
= 0 V 0A

x
(f1)
A

+ nA 1
2
= 0
V 0B

x
(f2)
B

+nA+
nB 1
2
= 0 V 0B

x
(f1)
B

+ nB 1
2
= 0
Ahead-seeking
Aggregate point
V 0A

x
(a2)
A

+(n  1) = 0 V 0A

x
(a1)
A;i

+(nA  1)1[i>mA] = 0
V 0B

x
(a2)
B

= 0 V 0B

x
(a1)
B;i

+(nB   1)1[i>mB ] = 0
Full distribution
V 0A

x
(f2)
A;i

+(nB + i  1) = 0 V 0A

x
(f1)
A;i

+(i  1) = 0
V 0B

x
(f2)
B;i

+(i  1) = 0 V 0B

x
(f1)
B;i

+(i  1) = 0
Note:m is such that U
(a1)
;i (L

 ; x i)U (a1);i (R ; x i) when x i = ((m 1)L+(n m)R)=(n 1) and U (a1);i (R ; x i)
U
(a1)
;i (L

 ; x i) when x i = (mL +(n  m   1)R)=(n   1).
Finally, group performance can be enhanced through other social mechanisms, such as comple-
mentarities in production (e.g., classroom case discussion) and peer pressure (e.g., weight watcher
programs). We hope that this paper will generate further research interest in these group dynamics.
Appendix
A. Proofs and Supplementary Results
Notations. We use the following notation for each of our eight game congurations, depending on whether
players are ahead-seeking or behind-averse ( or ), whether they receive an aggregate reference point or the
full reference distribution (a or f), and whether their reference group is uniform or diverse, i.e., comprising
1 or 2 player types (1 or 2). For instance, x
(f1)
Ai refers to the equilibrium strategy played by player i of type
A when players are ahead-seeking, and have the full reference distribution from a uniform reference group,
all players being of type A; and U
(f1)
Ai refers to his utility. For  = ; and r= a; f , we denote x
[r2] as the
output of two diverse sections of size n, each consisting of n=2 players of each type, and x[r1] as the output
of two uniform sections, with one section consisting of n type-A players and the other section consisting of
n type-B players. Table A-1 provides a summary of the equilibrium conditions from Propositions 1-4.
Lemma A-1. Suppose players are behind-averse. Then, in any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, all players
of the same type must choose the same output.
Proof. Suppose there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium x such that xi < x

j with both i; j of
type . Note that x j  x i componentwise, so U 0(x;x j)  U 0(x;x i) for all x. Thus, we must have
argmaxU(x;x

 j) argmaxU(x;x i), which implies xj  xi , a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma A-1 in appendix, x;i = x for all i. Given that n[x xi]+ = [
P
j 6=i xj 
(n  1)xi]+ = (n  1)[x i xi]+, the utility functions and rst derivatives can be expressed as:
U(xi;x i) = V(xi)  (n  1)  [x i xi]+ and U 0(xi;x i) = V 0 (xi)+ (n  1) 1[x ixi]:
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Given any x i, U 0(xi;x i) is strictly decreasing in xi, so U is strictly concave and has a unique maximum.
(i) Suppose nA  1 and nB  1. In any equilibrium, we must have x 2 [L;R], and since LA >RB, it follows
that xA > x i >xB. Using the rst-order condition, we must have V 0A(x

A) = 0 and V
0
B(x

B)+ (n 1) = 0, so
xA =LA and x

B =RB.
(ii) Now, suppose all players are of type- (i.e., n = n). Any equilibrium must have x 2 [C (0);C (n 1)].
This is indeed an equilibrium because for any small  > 0, U 0(x  ;x i) = V 0 (x  )+ (n  1) > V 0 (x)+
(n  1)  V 0 (C (n  1))+ (n  1) = 0 and similarly U 0(x + ;x i)< 0, so x is a best response. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The utility functions and rst derivatives can be expressed as:
U(xi;x i) = V(xi) 
X
j 6=i
[xj  xi]+ and U 0(xi;x i) = V 0 (xi)+
X
j 6=i
1[xjxi]:
Given any x i, U 0(xi;x i) is strictly decreasing in xi, so U is strictly concave and has a unique maximum.
Since x 2 [L;R] and LA > RB, we must have that xA > xB. Therefore, any type-A player is behind
between 0 and nA   1 other players, and any type-B player is behind between nA and n  1 other players.
Thus, any equilibrium must have xA 2 [CA(0);CA(nA   1)] and xB 2 [CB(nA);CB(n   1)]. It remains to
show that such a strategy prole is indeed an equilibrium. For any small  > 0, note that U 0B(xB   ;x i) =
V 0B(xB  )+(n 1) > V 0B(xB)+(n 1)  V 0B(CB(n 1))+(n 1) = 0 and similarly U 0B(xB+ ;x i)< 0,
so xB is a best response. Similarly xA is a best response. 
Lemma A-2. Suppose players are ahead-seeking and have an aggregate reference point. Then, in any pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium, the output of each type- player must be either L or R.
Proof. Depending on whether xi is larger or smaller than x i, we know U 0(xi; x i) is either V
0
 (xi) or
V 0 (xi)+ (n  1). Therefore, the only choices that satisfy the rst-order conditions are L and R. 
Lemma A-3. Suppose players are ahead-seeking and have an aggregate reference point. There is a unique
point c =R  V(L) V(R)(n 1) 2 [L;R] such that U(L;x i)U(R;x i) when x i  c and U(L;x i)
U(R;x i) when x i  c.
Proof of Lemma A-3. Given that n[xi   x]+ = [(n   1)xi  
P
j 6=i xj ]
+ = (n   1)[xi   x i]+, the utility
functions and rst derivatives can be expressed as:
U(xi;x i) = V(xi)+ (n  1)  [xi  x i]+ and U 0(xi;x i) = V 0 (xi)+ (n  1) 1[xix i]:
By Lemma A-2, each player chooses either L or R. When x i L, we have U(L;x i)U(R;x i) since
R maximizes utility for a player ahead of the mean. When x i  R, we have U(L;x i)  U(R;x i)
since L maximizes utility for a player behind the mean. As x i increases from L to R, U(L;x i) remains
constant and equal to V(L) whereas U(R;x i) decreases. Finally, we obtain the expression for c using
U(L;x i) =U(R;x i) when x i = c, i.e., V(L) = V(R)+ (n  1)  (R   c). 
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof uses Lemmas A-2 and A-3 in the appendix. Dene l= (n 1)cB+LB
n
and
r= (n 1)cA+RA
n
, where cA; cB are as dened in Lemma A-3. Consider case (ii) of what we need to prove, so we
have nARA+nBLB
n
< r, which implies (nA 1)RA+nBRB
n 1 < cA. Suppose we have an equilibrium in which player i
of type-A chooses LA. Since the largest choices of all other players are R, we have x i  (nA 1)RA+nBRBn 1 < cA,
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which by Lemma A-3 implies that the best response of player i is RA instead, so we have a contradiction.
In other words, all type-A players must choose RA in equilibrium. Similarly, all type-B players must choose
LB in equilibrium. Thus, we have a unique equilibrium with mA = 0 and mB = nB.
Next, consider case (i). Since nARA+nBLB
n
< l < r, the same argument as the one above shows that all type-
A players must choose RA in equilibrium. Further,
nARA+nBLB
n
< l implies nARA+(nB 1)LB
n 1 < cB. Thus, there
is a unique mB 2 [1; nB 1] such that nARA+(mB 1)LB+(nB mB)RBn 1 > cB and nARA+mBLB+(nB mB 1)RBn 1 < cB.
By Lemma A-3, both these inequalities must be satised if it is an equilibrium for exactly mB type-B players
to choose LB. Therefore, we have a unique equilibrium with mB as dened above. The proof for case (iii) is
similar. 
Lemma A-4. Suppose players are ahead-seeking and have the full reference distribution. Then, in any
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, no pair of players choose the same output.
Proof. Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium x in which player i (of type ) chooses xi = z, k  1
other players also choose z, and exactly k0 players choose output strictly less than z. Then, for any small
 > 0, U 0(z   ;x) = V 0 (z   ) + k0 and U 0(z + ;x i) = V 0 (z + ) + (k + k0). Since k  1, we must have
U 0(z  ;x i)<U 0(z+ ;x i). Thus, xi = z cannot be a best response and we have a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The utility functions and rst derivatives can be expressed as:
U(xi;x i) = V(xi)+
X
j 6=i
[xi xj ]+ and U 0(xi;x i) = V 0 (xi)+
X
j 6=i
1[xixj]:
By Lemma A-4, all output choices are distinct. Since LA > RB, the lowest nB outputs come from type-B
players. By the rst-order condition, the ith lowest output must satisfy V 0B(xi)+ (i  1)= 0, leading to the
same vector x as in the proposition. It remains to verify that x is indeed an equilibrium. Consider player i
of type  who chooses x;i that is greater than or equal to exactly ~ni elements of x
. Based on the rst-order
condition for x;i, we have U
0
(xi;x

 i) = V
0
 (xi)+ ~ni= 0 at xi = x

;i and U
0
(xi;x

 i)> 0 for xi 2 [x;i 1; x;i).
Next, based on the rst-order condition for x;i 1, we have U
0
(xi;x

 i)> 0 for xi 2 [x;i 2; x;i 1). Continuing
in this way, we have U 0(xi;x

 i)> 0 for every xi 2 [L; x;i). Similarly, we can show U 0(xi;x i)< 0 for every
xi 2 (x;i;R]. Therefore, x;i is a best response and we have a Nash equilibrium. 
Lemma A-5. 1. x
[f2]
A;i  x[f1]A;i and x[f2]B;i  x[f1]B;i ; x[a2]A;i  x[a1]A;i and x[a2]B;i  x[a1]B;i ;
2. x
[f2]
A  x[f1]A and x[f2]B  x[f1]B ; x[a2]A  x[a1]A and x[a2]B  x[a1]B .
Proof. The proof follows from comparing the respective entries in Table A-1 after making the following
substitutions for all  = ;, r = a; f , and i= 1; : : : ;2n: (i) x
[r2]
;i = x
(r2)
;d i
2
e with nA = n=2 and nB = n=2 and
(ii) x
[r1]
;i = x
(r1)
;i with nA = n and nB = n. For any i= 1; : : : ;2n:
1. V 0A(x
[f1]
A;i )+(i  1) = 0 = V 0A(x[f2]A;i )+(n=2+ d i2e  1) V 0A(x[f2]A;i )+(i  1). Hence, x[f1]A;i  x[f2]A;i .
And, V 0B(x
[f2]
B;i )+(d i2e 1) = 0= V 0B(x[f1]B;i )+(i 1) V 0B(x[f1]B;i )+(d i2e 1). Hence, x[f2]B;i  x[f1]B;i . And,
V 0A(x
[a1]
A;i )+(n 1)1[i>mA] = 0= V 0A(x[a2]A )+(n 1) V 0A(x[a2]A )+(n 1)1[i>mA]. Hence, x[a1]A;i  x[a2]A;i .
And, V 0B(x
[a2]
B ) = 0= V
0
B(x
[a1]
B;i )+(n  1)1[i>mB ]  V 0B(x[a1]B;i ). Hence, x[a2]B;i  x[a1]B;i .
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2. V 0A(x
[f2]
A ) + 
n=2 1
2
= 0 = V 0A(x
[f1]
A ) + 
n 1
2
 V 0A(x[f1]A ) +  n=2 12 . Hence, x[f2]A  x[f1]A . And,
V 0B(x
[f1]
B ) + 
n 1
2
= 0 = V 0B(x
[f2]
B ) + n=2 + 
n=2 1
2
 V 0B(x[f2]B ) +  n 12 . Hence, x[f1]B  x[f2]B . And,
V 0A(x
[a2]
A ) = 0 = V
0
A(x
[a1]
A ) + 
n 1
2
 V 0A(x[a1]A ). Hence, x[a2]A  x[a1]A . And, V 0B(x[a1]B ) +  n 12 = 0 =
V 0B(x
[a2]
B )+(n  1) V 0B(x[a2]B )+ n 12 . Hence, x[a1]B  x[a2]B . 
Lemma A-6. 1. x
(a2)
A;i  x(f2)A;i and x(a2)B;i  x(f2)B;i ;
2. x
(a2)
A;i  x(f2)A;i and x(a2)B;i  x(f2)B;i .
Proof. From Table A-1, we obtain:
1. For i= 1; : : : ; nA, V
0
A(x
(f2)
A;i )+(nB+ i 1) = 0= V 0A(x(a2)A )+(n 1) V 0A(x(a2)A )+(nB+ i 1); i.e.,
x
(f2)
A;i  x(a2)A . For i= 1; : : : ; nB, V 0B(x(a2)B ) = 0= V 0B(x(f2)B;i )+(i  1) V 0B(x(f2)B;i ); i.e., x(a2)B;i  x(f2)B .
2. For i = 1; : : : ; nA, V
0
A(x
(a2)
A ) = 0 = V
0
A(x
(f2)
A ) + 
nA 1
2
 V 0A(x(f2)A ); i.e., x(a2)A  x(f2)A . For i =
1; : : : ; nB, V
0
B(x
(f2)
B ) + nA + 
nB 1
2
= 0 = V 0B(x
(a2)
B ) + (n  1) V 0B(x(a2)B ) + nA +  nB 12 ; i.e., x(f2)B 
x
(a2)
B . 
Proof of Proposition 5. In Lemma EC.1 in the electronic companion, we show that
PnA
i=1 x
(a2)
A;i +PnB
i=1 x
(a2)
B;i 
PnA
i=1 x
(f2)
A;i +
PnB
i=1 x
(f2)
B;i and
PnA
i=1 x
(a2)
A;i +
PnB
i=1 x
(a2)
B;i 
PnA
i=1 x
(f2)
A;i +
PnB
i=1 x
(f2)
B;i if
and only if nA  nB. And, that
P2n
i=1 x
[a2]
i =
P2n
i=1 x
[a1]
i =
P2n
i=1 x
[f2]
i =
P2n
i=1 x
[f1]
i and
P2n
i=1 x
[a2]
i =P2n
i=1 x
[a1]
i =
P2n
i=1 x
[f2]
i =
P2n
i=1 x
[f1]
i . 
Proof of Proposition 6. When nA = nB,
PnA
i=1 x
(r2)
A;i +
PnB
i=1 x
(r2)
B;i is constant across all r = a; f by
Proposition 5, for any  = ;. Note that x(r2) = (x
(r2)
B ;x
(r2)
A ) is sorted in ascending order for
any  = ;, and r = a; f . For all  = ; and r = a; f , dene s
(r2)
l =
Pl
i=1 x
(r2)
i , l = 1; : : : ; n. In
Lemma EC.2 in the electronic companion, we show that s
(a2)
l  s(f2)l and s(f2)l  s(a2)l for all l 
n. Hence, the sorted output vectors x(r2) can be ordered according to majorization (Hardy et al.
1952, p. 45):  x(a2)   x(f2) and  x(f2)   x(a2). From Theorem 108 in Hardy et al. (1952), we
obtain that
PnA
i=1W (x
(a2)
A;i ) +
PnB
i=1W (x
(a2)
B;i )
PnA
i=1W (x
(f2)
A;i ) +
PnB
i=1W (x
(f2)
B;i ) and
PnA
i=1W (x
(f2)
A;i ) +PnB
i=1W (x
(f2)
B;i )
PnA
i=1W (x
(a2)
A;i )+
PnB
i=1W (x
(a2)
B;i ) if and only if W (x) is convex.
Fix  = ; and r = a; f . By Proposition 5,
P2n
i=1 x
[r1]
i =
P2n
i=1 x
[r2]
i . Note that x
[r1] =

x
[r1]
B ;x
[r1]
A

is sorted in ascending order, and so is x[r2]. Let us dene s
(r1)
l =
Pl
i=1 x
[r1]
i , l = 1; : : : ;2n. In Lemma
EC.3 in the electronic companion, we show that s
(r1)
l 
Pl
i=1 x
[r2]
i and s
(r1)
l 
Pl
i=1 x
[r2]
i for all l 
2n, for any r = a; f . Therefore,  x[r1]   x[r2] and  x[r1]   x[r2], for r = a; f . From Theorem
108 in Hardy et al. (1952), we then obtain that
P2n
i=1W

x
[f2]
i

P2ni=1W x[f1]i , P2ni=1W x[a2]i  P2n
i=1W

x
[a1]
i

,
P2n
i=1W

x
[f2]
i

P2n
i=1W

x
[f1]
i

, and
P2n
i=1W

x
[a2]
i

P2n
i=1W

x
[a1]
i

if and only
if W (x) is convex. 
Lemma A-7. 1. When V (x) is quadratic, U
[f2]
A;i U [f1]A;i and U [f2]B;i U [f1]B;i ; When V (x) is quadratic,
U
[a2]
A;i U [a1]A;i and U [a2]B;i U [a1]B;i ;
2. U
[f2]
A U [f1]A and U [f2]B U [f1]B ; U [a2]A U [a1]A and U [a2]B U [a1]B .
Proof. The rst result follows from Lemma EC.4 in the electronic companion.
Fix r= a; f . Because x
[r2]
A;i = x
[r2]
A and x
[r1]
A;i = x
[r1]
A for all i, U
[r2]
A = VA

x
[r2]
A

and U
[r1]
A = VA

x
[r1]
A

.
Because x
[r2]
A  x[r1]A by Lemma A-5, U [r2]A U [r1]A since V 0A(x) 0 for any xLA.
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We have U
[f2]
B = VB

x
[f2]
B

  nA
h
x
[f2]
A  x[f2]B
i+
 VB

x
[f2]
B

and U
[a2]
B;i = VB

x
[a2]
B

  (n  
1)
h
x
[a2]
 i  x[a2]B
i+
 VB

x
[a2]
B

, whereas U
[f1]
B = VB

x
[f1]
B

and U
[a1]
B = VB

x
[a1]
B

. Fix r = a; f .
Because x
[r2]
B  x[r1]B by Lemma A-5, VB

x
[r2]
B

 VB

x
[r1]
B

by concavity. Hence, U
[r1]
B U [r2]B . 
Lemma A-8. 1. U
(a2)
B;i U (f2)B;i for all i; when V (x) is quadratic, U (a2)A;i U (f2)A;i for all i if nA  n=2;
2. U
(a2)
A;i U (f2)A;i for all i; when V (x) is quadratic, U (a2)B;i U (f2)B;i for all i if nA  n=2.
Proof. From Table A-1, x
(a2)
B = L

B; therefore, U
(a2)
B = V (L

B). On the other hand, U
(f2)
B;i =
V

x
(f2)
B;i

+
P
j 6=i
h
x
(f2)
B;i  x(f2)B;j
i+
 V (LB) given that LB is feasible. Hence, U (f2)B;i U (a2)B;i for all i.
From Table A-1, x
(a2)
A =L

A  x(a2)B ; hence, U (a2)A = V
 
LA

. Since LA maximizes V (x), U
(a2)
A U (f2)A .
The remaining two results follow from Lemma EC.5 in the electronic companion. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Lemma EC.6 in the electronic companion shows that
PnA
i=1U
[f2]
A;i +
PnB
i=1U
[f2]
B;i =PnA
i=1U
[a2]
A;i +
PnB
i=1U
[a2]
B;i 
PnA
i=1U
[f1]
A;i +
PnB
i=1U
[f1]
B;i =
PnA
i=1U
[a1]
A;i +
PnB
i=1U
[a1]
B;i and
PnA
i=1U
[a1]
A;i +PnB
i=1U
[a1]
B;i =
PnA
i=1U
[f1]
A;i +
PnB
i=1U
[f1]
B;i 
PnA
i=1U
[a2]
A;i +
PnB
i=1U
[a2]
B;i 
PnA
i=1U
[f2]
A;i +
PnB
i=1U
[f2]
B;i . 
Proposition A-1. With behind-averse players and noisy performance metrics, there exists a unique pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium x such that x;i = x

 for i= 1; : : : ; n, =A;B, in which (x

B; x

A) solve
(i) V 0 (x

)+(n  1)

n (x  x)

p
n(n 1)

= 0 for =A;B with an aggregate reference point, and
(ii) V 0 (x

)+
(n 1)
2
+n 

x  x

p
2

= 0 for =A;B with the full reference distribution.
Proof. In both cases, existence is guaranteed given that Ui(xi;x i) is strictly concave for all i (Fudenberg
and Tirole 2000, Theorem 1.2). The game between all players of the same type is symmetric since they have
the same utility functions and same action spaces. Moreover, the action spaces are completely ordered (since
they are intervals) and the utility functions are strictly supermodular since
@2U
(a)
i (xi;x i)
@xj@xi
= (n  1)
 
xi  x ip
n
n 1
!
1p
n(n  1) > 0 and
@2U
(f)
i (xi;x i)
@xj@xi
= 

xi xjp
2

1p
2
> 0:
As a result for any x , the equilibrium between all type- players must be unique (Vives 1999). Therefore,
x;i = x for all i= 1; : : : ; n. This yields the equilibrium conditions.
Uniqueness follows from the global univalence theorem (Gale and Nikaido^ 1965) by showing that the
Jacobian matrix obtained from the equilibrium conditions is diagonally-dominant:@2U
(a)
;i (xi;x i)
@x2i
 =  V 00 (xi)+ (n  1)p n
n 1

 
xi  x ip
n
n 1
!
>
X
j 6=i
@2U
(a)
;i (xi;x i)
@xj@xi
 ;@2U
(f)
;i (xi;x i)
@x2i
 =  V 00 (xi)+X
j 6=i


xi xjp
2

1p
2
>
X
j 6=i
@2U
(f)
;i (xi;x i)
@xj@xi
 : 
Proposition A-2. With ahead-seeking players and noisy performance metrics,
(i) When ! 0, there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium that is identical to the equilibria pre-
sented in Propositions 3 and 4.
(ii) When     (0)(n 1)
maxx V 00(x)
p
n
n 1
, there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium x such that x;i = x

 for
i= 1; : : : ; n, =A;B, in which (x

B; x

A) solve
(ii.a) V 0 (x

)+(n  1)

n (x x )

p
n(n 1)

= 0 for =A;B with an aggregate reference point, and
(ii.b) V 0 (x

)+
(n 1)
2
+n 

x x p
2

= 0 for =A;B, with the full reference distribution.
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Proof. (i) Consider rst the case with the full reference distribution. Similar to Lemma A-4, one can show
that xi 6= xj in every equilibrium. Moreover, we obtain by L'Hospital's rule that lim!0 

xi xjp
2

1

= 0 for
any xi 6= xj , i.e., lim!0U 00;i(xi;x i) = V 00 (xi)< 0. The rst-order condition then yield V 0 (xj)+(j  1) = 0
for all j. The rest of the proof then consists in showing, similar to the proof of Proposition 4, that setting
xi 2 [xj ; xj+1] is never a best response exploiting the fact Ui(xi;x i) is strictly concave on that interval. The
proof of the case with an aggregate reference point follows a similar argument.
(ii) Consider the case with an aggregate reference point. For any xi, x i,
U 00;i(xi;x i) = V
00
 (x)+(n  1)
 
xi  x ip
n
n 1
!
1p
n
n 1
max
x
V 00 (x)+(n  1) (0)
1p
n
n 1
 0
by assumption on . Accordingly, U;i(x;x i) is concave everywhere. As a result, there exists a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole 2000, Theorem 1.2). The argument for the case with the full reference
distribution is identical. The rst-order optimality conditions are, respectively with an aggregate reference
point and the full reference distribution: V 0 (x

i )+(n 1)

xi x ip
n
n 1

= 0 and V 0 (x

i )+
P
j 6=i

xi xjp
2

=
0. Setting x;i = x

 for i= 1; : : : ; n in those equilibrium conditions yields the result. 
B. Model Extensions
B.1. Reference groups with both ahead-seeking and behind-averse players
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium when the reference group consists of both ahead-seeking and
behind-averse players. An illustration is provided in Appendix B.3.1. Let us respectively denote with n
and n the number of ahead-seeking and behind-averse type- players, with n

 +n

 = n. Denote output as
x= (xB;x

B;x

A;x

A). Suppose that n > n

A; n

B for otherwise, the setting would be identical to Propositions
1, 2, 3, or 4. As before, we assume non-overlapping strategy sets across types, i.e., maxfRB;RBg<LA.
Because Lemma A-1 and Lemmas A-2-A-4 continue to hold, the equilibrium here with an aggregate
reference point superimposes the equilibria obtained in Propositions 1 and 3.
Proposition B-1. Suppose players have an aggregate reference point. There is a unique pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium, in which all n type- behind-averse players choose z, m

 type- ahead-seeking players
choose L and n

  m of the remaining type- ahead-seeking players choose R , for =A;B. There exist
constants l 2 [LB;RB] and r 2 [LA;RB] (so LB < l <RB <LA < r <RA) such that:
(i) If
nAR

A+n

A
L

A
+n
B
R

B
+nBL

B
n
2 [LB; l), then mA = 0, zA = LA, zB =
minfRB; m

BL

B+(n

B mB)RB+nAL

A
+nAR

A
n n
B
g, and mB 2 [1; nB   1].
(ii) If
nAR

A+n

A
L

A
+n
B
R

B
+nBL

B
n
2 (l; r), then mA = 0, zA =LA, zB =RB, and mB = nB.
(iii)
nAR

A+n

A
L

A
+n
B
R

B
+nBL

B
n
2 (r;RA], then mA 2 [1; nA 1], zA =minfRA; n

BL

B+n

B
R

B
+mAL

A+(n

A mA)RA
n n
A
g,
zB =R

B, and m

B = n

B.
Hence, the introduction of ahead-seeking players in the reference group makes behind-averse players stabilize
on one equilibrium, unlike Proposition 2, which established existence of multiple equilibria.
Similarly, the equilibrium with both ahead-seeking and behind-averse players with the full reference dis-
tribution superimposes the equilibria obtained in Propositions 2 and 4.
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Proposition B-2. Suppose players have the full reference distribution. For any mB 2 f0; : : : ; nBg, mA 2
f0; : : : ; nAg, zB 2 [maxfCB(nB  mB + nA);CB(mB   1)g;minfCB(n  1 mB);CB(mB + nB)g], and zA 2
[maxfCA(nA mA);CA(nB+mA 1)g;minfCA(nA mA 1);CA(nB+mA+nA)], x is a Nash equilibrium,
dened as xi =C

B(i  1) for i= 1; : : : ;mB, xi =CB(nB + i  1) for i=mB +1; : : : ; nB, xi = zB for i= nB +
1; : : : ; nB, x

i =C

A(i 1) for i= nB+1; : : : ; nB+mA, xi =CA(nA+ i 1) for i= nB+mA+1; : : : ; nB+nA,
and xi = zA for i= nB +n

A+1; : : : ; n.
It can be checked that a Nash equilibrium always exists since the value of zB that satises C

B(n

B  mB +
nA) = C

B(m

B   1) is smaller than the allowed upper bound, minfCB(n   1  mB);CB(mB + nB)g when
nB  1, and similarly for zA. Moreover, the set of possible Nash equilibria is convex since the lower and
upper bounds on z are respectively convex and concave functions of m

 , for =A;B.
B.2. Overlapping Strategy Sets
In this appendix, we consider overlapping strategy sets, i.e., we allow for the dierence between the two
player types to be so small that LA <RB. The next four propositions list the equilibrium results, analogous
to Propositions 1 to 4. Illustrations are provided in Appendix B.3.
We rst consider behind-averse players. With overlapping strategy sets, it is now possible for all players to
choose the same output in equilibrium, in contrast to our basic analysis, in which the players' choices cluster
at one end of the strategy set (i.e., at the low end for type-A and at the high end for type-B players), but
they do not coincide. Now, the choices of both types converge to the same point, which as before is nearer
the upper end of type-B's strategy set and nearer the lower end of type-A's strategy set.
Proposition B-3. Suppose players are behind-averse and have an aggregate reference point. For any
z 2 [LA;RB], xA = xB = z is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition B-4. Suppose players are behind-averse and have the full reference distribution.
(i) For any z 2 [LA;RB], xA = xB = z is a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) For any zA 2 [CA(0);CA(nA  1)] and zB 2 [CB(nA);CB(n  1)] such that zA > zB, xA = zA; xB = zB is a
Nash equilibrium.
We next consider ahead-seeking players. We show that the equilibria have the same structure as in our
basic analysis with non-overlapping strategy sets. With aggregate reference points, choices are polarized at
either the lowest or the highest end of each type's strategy set. With the full reference distribution, choices
are spread out along the strategy set such that no pair chooses the same output. These observations are
incredibly robust. However, with overlapping strategy sets, there is a multitude of equilibria, in contrast to
our basic analysis of non-overlapping strategy sets, which had a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proposition B-5. Suppose players are ahead-seeking and have an aggregate reference point. Consider a
strategy prole x in which m type- players choose L and n  m of the remaining type- players choose
R, for =A;B. Let x be the average choice of all players. There exists constants l; l
0 2 [LB;RB] satisfying
LB < l
0 < l <RB and r; r0 2 [LA;RA] satisfying LA < r < r0 <RA such that:
(i) If l0 < x< l < r and mA = 0, then x is a Nash equilibrium.
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(ii) If l < x< r and mA = 0 and mB = nB, then x is a Nash equilibrium.
(iii) If l < r < x< r0 and mB = nB, then x is a Nash equilibrium.
(iv) If l0 < x< r < l and mA = 0, then x is a Nash equilibrium.
(v) If r < x< l, then x is a Nash equilibrium.
(vi) If r < l < x< r0 and mB = nB, then x is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition B-6. Suppose players are ahead-seeking and have the full reference distribution. Consider
a strategy prole x in which no two players of the same type choose the same output. Further, suppose
V 0A(xA;i)+A;i = 0 for i= 1; : : : ; nA, and V
0
B(xB;i)+B;i = 0 for i= 1; : : : ; nB, where ;i is the number of
players choosing a smaller output than the i-th type- player. Then x is a Nash equilibrium.
B.3. Numerical Examples
In this section, we present a series of numerical examples. In all cases, the equilibria are reached through a
sequential ta^tonnement process, starting from x =L, =A;B. In each gure, type-A and type-B players
are respectively represented with a `+' and a `' markers. The size of each marker is proportional to the
number of players choosing that particular output. The dotted curves show the bounds LA;RA within which
outputs of type-A players must lie, and the solid curves show analogous bounds LB;RB for type-B players.
Ahead-seeking and behind-averse players are respectively displayed in grey and black. Ahead-seeking players
tend to choose outputs near the outside boundaries LB and R

A and behind-averse players tend to choose
outputs near the inside boundaries RB and L

A.
B.3.1. Heterogeneous Groups and Overlapping Strategy Sets. We rst present numerical exam-
ples of equilibrium outputs when (i) the reference group consist of both ahead-seeking and behind-averse
players and (ii) strategy sets of type-A and type-B players overlap, thereby stress-testing our results in
Propositions 1-4 to those assumptions and illustrating the analytical developments from Appendices B.1-B.2.
Figures B-1 and B-2 consider the case with individual references points whereas Figures B-3 and B-4
consider the cases with aggregate reference points. The parameters are: VB(x) = 100x x2, VA(x+k) = VB(x),
nA = nB = 6. Moreover,  = 3 and  = 2 in Figures B-1 and B-3 and  = 2 and  = 3 in Figures B-2 and
B-4. We moreover consider asymmetric congurations of reference groups with nA = n

B = 2 ahead-seeking
players in the left gures and nA = n

B = 4 ahead-seeking players in the right gures.
Overall, all gures exhibit clustering behavior of behind-averse players and dispersion of ahead-seeking
players, either very polarized at the outer boundaries of the strategy sets (aggregate reference point), or
more uniformly distributed, but still anchored at the outer boundaries of the strategy sets (full reference
distribution). Overall, the insights obtained in Propositions 1-4, with non-overlapping strategy sets and
common kind of social comparison at work, appear to be very robust to those assumptions.
B.3.2. Value Function and Overlapping Strategy Sets. We nally display in Figure B-5 the equi-
librium outputs when V (x) = 100x xp for various values of p. The purpose of this study is to show that the
equilibrium outcomes obtained with a quadratic value function (p= 2) are representative of the outcomes
obtained with other value functions, and therefore, that the results that have been obtained for the quadratic
case are robust (Propositions 5-7 and Lemmas A-7 and A-8 which lie behind Table 2). A byproduct of this
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Figure B-1 Equilibrium outputs with the full reference distribution and diverse reference groups, consisting of
both ahead-seeking and behind-averse players with = 3 and  = 2.
0 10 20
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
k
o
u
tp
ut
RαA
LαA
RαB
LαB
0 10 20
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
k
o
u
tp
ut
LαB
RαB
LαA
RαA
Note. nA = n

B = 2 (left) and n

A = n

B = 4 (right).
Figure B-2 Equilibrium outputs with the full reference distribution and diverse reference groups, consisting of
both ahead-seeking and behind-averse players with = 2 and  = 3.
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Figure B-3 Equilibrium outputs with an aggregate reference point and diverse reference groups, consisting of
both ahead-seeking and behind-averse players with = 3 and  = 2.
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B = 4 (right).
numerical analysis is to demonstrate the robustness of Propositions 1-4 with respect to the assumption that
the strategy sets do not overlap, similar to Appendix B.2.
Because the equilibrium outputs may vary widely (e.g., [LB;RB] = [11:7;12:5] and [LA;RA] = [17:7;18:5]
when p= 2:5 and [LB;RB] = [4444;5378] and [LA;RA] = [4450;5384] when p= 1:5), we linearly normalize all
quantities between LB and RA for comparison purposes. Note that the action sets [LB;RB] and [LA;RA] are
overlapping when p 1:75 and become clustered near LB and RA as p increases.
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Figure B-4 Equilibrium outputs with an aggregate reference point and diverse reference groups, consisting of
both ahead-seeking and behind-averse players with = 2 and  = 3.
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Figure B-5 Equilibrium outputs x for dierent value functions V (x) = 100x xp.
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Note. The parameters are: k= 6, =  = 2, nA = nB = 3.
We make the following observations from Figure B-5. For large values of p, the numerical solutions are
similar to the top plots from Figures 2 and 3 with diverse reference groups. For small values of p, our
numerical results look like the bottom plots from Figures 2 and 3 with uniform reference groups, focusing on
only one section. Indeed when p is very small, the strategy sets [LB;RB] and [LA;RA] overlap, mimicking a
scenario with one uniform type. This numerical study suggests that the structure of our equilibria described
in Propositions 1-4 remains valid for a wide range of value functions and that the equilibrium outcomes
obtained with a quadratic value function are representative of those obtained with other value functions.
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Table EC.1 Outputs and utilities with quadratic value functions VA(x+ k) = rA+ px  qx2=2 and VB(x) = rB + px  qx2=2, with q > 0 when
LA =L
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B ;RBg.
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Note: m = n=2 if n is even and can be equal to either (n   1)=2 or (n +1)=2 if n is odd.
Additional Results for Quadratic Value Functions
Table EC.1 displays the equilibrium outputs and utilities for all games and all player types
when the value function V (x) is quadratic, obtained from Table A-1 in the appendix of the paper.
Specically, we assume that VA(x + k) = rA + px   qx2=2 and VB(x) = rB + px   qx2=2, with
q > 0. Accordingly, LA = L

A = p=q + k, L

B = L

B = p=q, R

A(n) = p=q + (n  1)=q + k, RB(n) =
p=q+(n  1)=q, RA(n) = p=q+ (n  1)=q+ k, and RB(n) = p=q+ (n  1)=q. With a quadratic
value function, the condition that strategy sets do not overlap is equivalent to requiring that
kmaxf;g(n  1)=q.
Lemma EC.1 (Total Output). When V (x) is quadratic,
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Proof. For all  = ;, r= a; f , de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rst result.
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Lemma EC.2. When V (x) is quadratic and nA = nB = n=2, s
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a2)l for all l. This shows the desired result. 
Lemma EC.3. When V (x) is quadratic,
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Lemma EC.4. When V (x) is quadratic,
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[r1]
;i =U
(r1)
;i with
nA = n and nB = n, for  = ; and r= f; p, and i= 1; : : : ;2n:
1. U
[f2]
A;i  U [f1]A;i , 
2
2q
(n
2
+ d i
2
e   1) + n
2
k  2
2q
(i  1), which holds true for all i  n. And,
U
[f2]
B;i U [f1]B;i , 
2
2q
(d i
2
e  1) 2
2q
(i  1), which is always true.
2. U
[a2]
A;i U [a1]A;i , 
2
q
(n 1)  n
2
  n 1
2

+n
2
k 2
q
(n  1)  n
2
  n 1
2

1[i>n2 ]
, which is always true.
And, U
[a2]
B;i U [a1]B;i , 0 
2
q
(n  1)  n
2
  n 1
2

1[i>n2 ]
, which is always true. 
Lemma EC.5. When V (x) is quadratic,
1. U
(a2)
A;i U (f2)A;i for all i if nA  n=2;
2. U
(a2)
B;i U (f2)B;i for all i if nA  n=2.
Proof. 1. From Table EC.1, we obtain that U
(a2)
A U (f2)A;nA if and only if (n 1)
 
nB   n 12

(n  1)=2 or equivalently, if and only if nA  n=2.
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2. From Table EC.1, we obtain that U
(a2)
B  U (f2)B if and only if  (n  1)2=2 + nA(n  1) 
 (n+nA 1)2=8+nAn=2 or equivalently, if and only if n2A+2nA(3n 5) 3(n 1)2  0. The right-
hand side is a quadratic equation in nA, equal to  3(n 2)2 < 0 when nA = 1 and to n2=4+n 3 0
when nA = n=2. Hence, there exists a root n^ between 0 and n=2. 
Lemma EC.6. When V (x) is quadratic,
nAX
i=1
U
[f2]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[f2]
B;i =
nAX
i=1
U
[a2]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[a2]
B;i 
nAX
i=1
U
[f1]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[f1]
B;i =
nAX
i=1
U
[a1]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[a1]
B;i
nAX
i=1
U
[a1]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[a1]
B;i =
nAX
i=1
U
[f1]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[f1]
B;i 
nAX
i=1
U
[a2]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[a2]
B;i 
nAX
i=1
U
[f2]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[f2]
B;i :
Proof. The result follows from comparing the respective entries in Table EC.1 after making
the following substitutions: (i) U
[r2]
;i = U
(r2)
;d i2 e
with nA = n=2 and nB = n=2 and (ii) U
[r1]
;i = U
(r1)
;i
with nA = n and nB = n, for any  = ; and r= f; p, and i= 1; : : : ;2n. We then obtain:
nAX
i=1
U
[f2]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[f2]
B;i = n
 
rA+
p2
2q
  
2
2q
 n
2
  1
2
2!
+n
 
rB +
p2
2q
  
2
2q
 3n
2
  1
2
2
 n
2

k  
q
n
2
!
nAX
i=1
U
[f1]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[f1]
B;i = n
 
rA+
p2
2q
  
2
2q

n  1
2
2!
+n
 
rB +
p2
2q
  
2
2q

n  1
2
2!
nAX
i=1
U
[a2]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[a2]
B;i = n

rA+
p2
2q

+n

rB +
p2
2q
  
2
2q
(n  1)2 n
2

k  
q
(n  1)

nAX
i=1
U
[a1]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[a1]
B;i = n
 
rA+
p2
2q
  
2
2q

n  1
2
2!
+n
 
rB +
p2
2q
  
2
2q

n  1
2
2!
nAX
i=1
U
[f2]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[f2]
B;i = n

rA+
p2
2q
+
2
2q

n
2
+
1
2
(
n
2
  1)

+
n
2
k

+n

rB +
p2
2q
+
2
2q
1
2
(
n
2
  1)

nAX
i=1
U
[f1]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[f1]
B;i = n

rA+
p2
2q
+
2
2q
(n  1)
2

+n

rB +
p2
2q
+
2
2q
(n  1)
2

nAX
i=1
U
[a2]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[a2]
B;i = n

rA+
p2
2q
+
2
q
(n  1)

n
2
  n  1
2

+
n
2
k

+n

rB +
p2
2q

nAX
i=1
U
[a1]
A;i +
nBX
i=1
U
[a1]
B;i = n

rA+
p2
2q
+
2
q
(n  1)
4

+n

rB +
p2
2q
+
2
q
(n  1)
4

It is easy to check that
PnA
i=1U
[f2]
A;i +
PnB
i=1U
[f2]
B;i =
PnA
i=1U
[a2]
A;i +
PnB
i=1U
[a2]
B;i , that
PnA
i=1U
[f1]
A;i +PnB
i=1U
[f1]
B;i =
PnA
i=1U
[a1]
A;i +
PnB
i=1U
[a1]
B;i and that
PnA
i=1U
[a1]
A;i +
PnB
i=1U
[a1]
B;i =
PnA
i=1U
[f1]
A;i +PnB
i=1U
[f1]
B;i . We nd that
PnA
i=1U
[a2]
A;i +
PnB
i=1U
[a2]
B;i 
PnA
i=1U
[f2]
A;i +
PnB
i=1U
[f2]
B;i if and only if
2(n 1)=(2q) 2(n n2=8 1=2)=(2q), which always holds true when n 2. Also,PnAi=1U [a1]A;i +PnB
i=1U
[a1]
B;i 
PnA
i=1U
[a2]
A;i +
PnB
i=1U
[a2]
B;i if and only if  2(n  1)2=(4q) 2(n  1)=(2q)  kn=2,
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which always holds true given that k (n 1)=q. Finally,PnAi=1U [a2]A;i +PnBi=1U [a2]B;i PnAi=1U [a1]A;i +PnB
i=1U
[a1]
B;i if and only if 
2(n  1)=(2q)+nk=2 2(n  1)=(2q), which is true for all k 0. 
